The 9th Infantry Division enters Belgium, on September 2nd, 1944
Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson’s diary entry for 2 September 1944 reads: « Were reported to be the first troops in Belgium ». There was no doubt in his mind that his unit was the first to cross the Belgian border. Chronicle of a discreet but historic episode.
Objective Germany!
September 1944 marked a turning point in the war in the west. The closure of the Falaise pocket dealt a fatal blow to Germany’s potential; the liberation of Paris, intact, was a symbolic international success; finally, the Allies successfully completed a new landing in Southern France, and the junction between the two fronts was about to be achieved. It was now just a matter of days before the German border was finally reached.
The staffs were celebrating. In the trucks, the infantrymen were betting on the number of days left to fight before taking Berlin. This optimism, no doubt excessive, was accentuated by a change in operational posture. Since crossing the Seine, the Allied divisions had been racing North and North-East. The great plains of Northern France were ideal for the deployment of mechanised units and the Germans did not seem to be in a position to put up any resistance to the steamroller formed by the 21st and 12th Army Groups.
31 August 1944, in the north of France, a member of the crew of this Sherman opens fire with a heavy machine gun, standing on the turret of the tank. This type of scene was not uncommon in the north of France at the end of August: armoured and mechanised units were confident and a few bursts of heavy weapons were often enough to dislodge the last occupants of the small villages. (Credits: U.S. NARA – U.S. Army Signal Corps)
The front line was no longer a front line: the speed of Allied reconnaissance outstripped that of the German withdrawal. From West to East, the Armies were said to be « liberating » without a fight. Montgomery stepped up the pace: he had to reach the Netherlands as quickly as possible to force fate and convince them of the relevance of his plan to invade Germany via the Ruhr. On the right, Patton – with Bradley’s implicit support – felt that he should head East, enter Germany via the Saar and from there make the leap to Frankfurt.
These two characters understood that, in the absence of a clear and strict directive from Ike, the tactical situation would decide what to do next. Once he had crossed the Seine, Patton launched his Third Army in a lightning pursuit due East, towards Alsace and Lorraine. But on his left, General Hodges, in command of the First Army, was in real trouble: he had to keep in touch with the Anglo-British on his left and Patton on his right. The direct consequence of the extension of the front Eastwards was the creation of a dangerous gap between the First and Third Armies, which grew wider every day. Bradley adapted: the First Army would act as a buffer on the right flank of Montgomery’s 21st Army Group to prevent any German counter-attack from the Ardennes.
Facing Bradley, Walter Model had been in command of Heeresgruppe B since 20 August. On 29 August, he received instructions to pull the German armies back on the Somme and to regroup his Panzer-Divisionen to organise a counter-attack towards the north-west. On its right flank, the 15. Armee had to take over the coastal fortresses to organise the defence of the ports. On the left, the 1. Armee consolidated its left flank with new troops arriving from Germany. The remains of the 7. Armee and the 5. Panzerarmee from the reorganisation of Panzergruppe West. This 5. Panzerarmee was commanded by SS-Oberst-Gruppenführer Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich.
A not-so-chaotic retreat
Contrary to popular belief, the German forces that pulled off the Falaise disaster did not flee in disorder towards Germany. While it was true that the lack of communication created a degree of disorganisation and confusion, the combat units had experienced cadres and the tactical instructions were clear. West of the Oise, Bittrich’s II. SS-Panzerkorps had to slow down the Americans with the 116. Panzerdivision. Bittrich ordered his infantry divisions to be deployed on the Oise behind the armoured elements of the 116. PzDiv. whose front was to extend as far as Hirson to link up with the units of the I. SS-Pz.Kps.
31 August 1944 in northern France, many German prisoners are guarded by American soldiers. The iconography of the German retreat in August 1944 is misleading, as the American Signal Corps only photographed the prisoners, while there are few if any photographs of the delaying action set up by the reorganised Kampfgruppen. The majority of these prisoners came from support troops, in this case from the Luftwaffe. (Credits: U.S. NARA – U.S. Army Signal Corps)
The I. SS-Pz.Kps. was commanded by SS-Obergruppenführer Georg Keppler. He determined a number of key points to hold, where he deployed his remaining combat potential. The main line of resistance was the Serre River: it was the last line of defence before Belgium. Control of its bridges was vital if he was to cross it and advance east of the Oise. At around 7.00 pm, the Kampfgruppe Mohnke of the 1. SS-Panzer-Division « Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler » (1. SS-PzDiv. LAH) took up position at Marle and controlled the road linking Laon to Hirson. Further East, Kampfgruppe Meyer of the 12. SS-Panzer-Division « Hitlerjugend » (12. SS-PzDiv HJ) occupied the villages of Montcornet (I. Battalion, SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 25 – I./SS-PzGren.-Rgt. 25) and Rozoy-sur-Serre (III./SS-PzGren.-Rgt. 26). Finally, to the west of Marle, Kampfgruppe Schwerin filled the space as far as the Oise with its 156. and 60. PzGren.-Rgt. deployed respectively near La Férée – where the Serre flows into the Oise – and Crécy-sur-Serre.
Successful pirouette for 3rd Armored Division
Since crossing the Aisne and liberating Soissons and Laon, the 3rd Armored Division (3rd A.D.) had been advancing at the head of the VII Corps. It was the Allied unit that had made the fastest and deepest breakthrough since the Seine. The next logical step for General Maurice Rose, commander of the 3rd A.D., was to attack the Meuse. On the evening of 30 August, the division assembled to prepare for a new offensive to the North-East, the aim of which was to capture the bridges at Sedan and Charleville-Mézières.
Once on the Meuse, Combat Command A and B (CCA & CCB) crossed the river and established a bridgehead as quickly as possible, while the CCR had to annihilate any pockets of German resistance it might encounter. At the front, the 83rd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (83rd A.R.Bn.) will sweep to locate possible crossing points for each column without engaging the enemy. Finally, the infantry of the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions, to which was added the entire motor potential of VII Corps and the 3rd A.D., would follow to exploit the breakthrough and consolidate the bridgeheads established by the armoured vehicles. The plan was simple, orders were transmitted to all units and to the infantry divisions. The men were ready.
On 31 August, the Regimental Combat Teams (R.C.T.) launched an assault on the Serre, supported by the Task Forces of the 3rd A.D. The German plan worked and the Americans were stopped on the Serre. The cannon thundered in Marle and Montcornet, where General Boudinot’s CCB was stopped by the Kampfgruppen Mohnke and Meyer. It was not until 7pm that Kurt Meyer gave the order to retreat to a new defensive line. On the evening of 31 August, the Serre was the front line for the CCB and the infantry of the 9th I.D.
Earlier in the day, an officer arrived at the 3rd A.D. command post near Laon. He had flown in from VII Corps headquarters to pass on an urgent order: the Corps was to change its direction of advance immediately and turn North. The new objective was the town of Mons, and the approach route was to pass through Hirson and Vervins. The idea did not come from General Collins, but from Bradley himself: intelligence indicated that German troops and Panzer units were gathering in the vicinity of Saint-Quentin. Bradley feared a counter-attack. He therefore imagined an encircling manoeuvre in which Collins’ VII Corps would envelop the right flank. This fear was confirmed by aerial reconnaissance confirming the presence of a large number of German armoured vehicles in the Saint-Quentin area, and captured documents revealed that the German divisions were indeed receiving orders from Walter Model, despite the confusion that reigned. These documents told the recipients that defensive lines had to be established and armoured capabilities assembled. The lightning advance of the last few days had stretched the lines of support and logistics, which, in the event of an enemy counter-attack, could have dramatic consequences for the First Army.
When the menssenger arrived at the 3rd A.D. command centre, Rose was not there: he had joined TF X and was already near Seraincourt. The challenge was considerable, as the division had to coordinate a complete reorganisation while in contact with the enemy, separated into five columns, each with its own mission. A message was sent by radio from the divisional command post: all units were to stop immediately and remain in position pending more precise orders. Finally, Rose was informed by radio, the message being relayed by each column commander. For General Boudinot, who commanded the CCB and was fighting on the Serre, the situation did not change much as he was already advancing Northwards. The morning’s delay was also fortunate, as his Combat Command did not have time to divert Eastwards.
To the East, Rose himself was in charge. It was a delicate moment, as TF X was engaged in fierce fighting near Novion-Porcien and TF Y was still in Rethel, battling with the town’s last occupants. After several efforts, TF X disengaged to reform the column and take the road Westwards towards Hauteville, climbing back up to Rozoy-sur-Serre. At the same time, TF Y committed all its forces to eliminating the last pockets of resistance around Rethel before taking the road North. The manoeuvre was a success.
First day of September, last day in France
On Friday 1 September, the General Rose launched his 3rd Armored Division in a frantic race towards Mons. From the positions acquired the previous day, the direction of advance was simple: due North. Meanwhile, the 9th I.D. had to advance on the right, protecting the Eastern flank of the VII Corps while moving towards the Meuse to secure the bridges with a view to crossing to the East.
It was 5 am. With the first light of day, the crews climbed into their vehicles. The three R.C.T. of the 9th I.D. knew their task: from West to East, the 47th R.C.T. would take Vervins, the 39th R.C.T. would march on Hirson, and the 60th R.C.T. to the East of the division would have to liberate Brunehamel from the German soldiers who had put up strong resistance the previous day in order to consolidate the Rozoy-sur-Serre – Brunehamel line and extend it as far as Aubenton. Departure was at 6 a.m. The 47th R.C.T. launched its battalions towards Vervins and met no resistance. When the 47th I.R. arrived in Vervins in the late morning, the town had already been secured. TFs 1 and 2 of the CCB entered the town at 8 a.m. and advanced as far as La Capelle, where fierce tank fighting ensued.
In the centre, the 39th R.C.T. also set off at 6 a.m. with the intention of taking Hirson, a major road junction. This town was the last stop before entering Belgium. It grew up on the edge of the Hirson and Saint-Michel forests, where French and Belgian resistance fighters took refuge during the Occupation. On the road to Hirson, the column came under an artillery barrage, but the armoured elements of the 3rd A.D. quickly intervened, enabling the 39th R.C.T. to reach a position South of Hirson at around 3pm.
To the East, the 60th R.C.T. had to take Brunehamel and continue on to Aubenton. The sector was considered to be the most dangerous since a TF of the 3rd A.D. had been held in check the previous day by Panther and Tiger I tanks and an 88-mm gun supporting part of Gruppe Olboeter. As with the other R.C.T., they set off at 6 a.m. from their defensive positions around Rozoy-sur-Serre. The I/60th I.R. was in the lead and had to enter Brunehamel, which it did by 8 a.m. without fighting. The III/60th I.R. crossed the village and took the lead to march on Aubenton. South of the small hamlet of Le Bourrelier, West of Aubenton, the Intelligence & Reconnaissance Platoon, 60th I.R. (I&R/60th I.R.) made contact with elements of the 9th Rcn. Tp: the SS still held Aubenton. This was correct, as Gruppe Olboeter had redeployed there the previous night. The information was relayed on the radio, in particular to Lieutenant-Colonel Keene N. ‘Slick’ Wilson, commanding the III/60th I.R., who had the delicate task of dislodging the Germans. At around 10 am, the first GIs reached Logny-lès-Aubenton. There they came across a column of armoured vehicles from the 3rd A.D. – probably from the CCR – heading towards Hirson. Once past the hamlet, the tactical approach continued in the direction of Aubenton and at midday, fighting began on the edge of the village. Wilson separated his forces: one company attacked on the right of the River Ton and a second tried to force its way into the village from the South bank and take the bridge leading to the centre of the village. By 1.30pm, the infantrymen had taken the bridge intact and the first houses in the village to the South-West and South-East had been liberated. The street fighting was fierce and Olboeter’s SS-Panzergrenadieren were relentless. Since 3 p.m., the battalion had lost contact with its companies fighting the enemy in the village.
At Marle, an 88-mm gun was abandoned by the SS Kampfgruppe Mohnke. This is exactly the same type of gun that defended Aubenton during the fighting on 1st September, against the III/60th I.R. (Credits: Illinois University Library – 3rd Armored Division)
It was not until 6.10pm and the end of the street fighting that Aubenton was cleared of Germans after intense fighting that lasted all afternoon. The American forces had not encountered such resistance since crossing the Seine a week earlier. It now seemed certain that the Germans were organising delaying tactics to allow Heeresgruppe B to withdraw and reorganise as quickly as possible. On the evening of 1 September, the ground gained in the 3rd A.D. and 9th I.D. sector was not as great as had been hoped. The front line had developed around the Belgian border, from Aubenton, Hirson, La Capelle and Avesnes-sur-Helpe.
To the West, the two battalions of the 47th R.C.T. settled around Vervins and took up positions around the town, setting up road blocks on each approach to the town centre. In the centre, the 39th R.C.T. was deployed around Landouzy-la-Cour, with its I/39th and II/39th I.R. close to the regimental headquarters and the III/39th I.R. spending the night at Le Chaudron, a hamlet less than two kilometres North of Landouzy-la-Cour. Finally, the 60th R.C.T., which had suffered a hellish afternoon at Aubenton, nevertheless achieved the objectives set by the division. The III/60th I.R., which had fought hard to take Aubenton, settled there for the night, while the I/60th I.R. was still in Brunehamel. The II/60th I.R. remained north of Rozoy-sur-Serre.
Eve of the Battle
On the evening of 1 September, Belgium had never been so close to liberation. In VII Corps’ area of operations, the objective had changed: General Collins was concentrating his efforts on liberating the town of Mons and, at the same time, capturing thousands of German soldiers who had gathered there. Normally, VII Corps was organised around an armoured division, with the two Combat Commands – the equivalent of armoured brigades – each supporting an infantry division, the 1st and 9th I.D. However, to win his bet against time, Collins allocated the entire 3rd A.D. to capture Mons and to support the 1st I.D. The 9th I.D. found itself without armoured support, which meant not only a lack of firepower, but above all a lack of motorisation for the infantry, who had to make do with their organic resources.
From then on, planning the next day’s operations became complicated for General Craig, who commanded the 9th I.D. Added to this logistical problem was the lack of reliable intelligence. Craig was worried that the German defences would be strengthened after a day of bitter fighting: he contacted the 60th I.R., which had spent the day in contact with the enemy:
« What do you think you have in front of you? Blue fought all day to take the town. »
The reports did not seem to assess the presence of combat forces capable of stopping the battle groups in such a brutal way.
Military planning involved prioritising resources and efforts in order to achieve tactical objectives. General Craig structured his strategy by defining the main effort on the South-North axis, with the objective of taking Philippeville, some fifty kilometres north-east of Aubenton. This main effort mainly concerned the 60th I.R., which was given additional motor pool to increase its mobility: three platoons of tank destroyers were detached from the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion (899th TD Bn.), while the divisional logistics officer allocated twenty-eight trucks from the 39th I.R. for the next day’s movement. Colonel Gibney’s plan – commanding the 60th I.R. – was simple: the regiment would move at 6 a.m. with the mission of taking the town of Chimay. The I/60th I.R. would advance in front, followed by the II/60th I.R., while the III/60th I.R. would take a more Easterly route. Major Gail H. Brown, recently appointed battalion commander of the I/60th I.R., will be supported by 57-mm anti-tank guns, 105-mm Howitzer guns, a reconnaissance platoon and a platoon of light tanks (M5 Stuart).
The force was getting ready, and the logistical problems seemed to have been resolved following a reorganisation of resources, but intelligence was still lacking. Colonel Gibney ordered a forward reconnaissance with two aims: firstly, to reconnoitre the route that would be taken towards Belgium the following day and secondly, to obtain more information on the enemy presence. A dozen or so scouts got ready as night fell and set off. The local roads were not indicated on the Michelin maps, so the crews mostly headed off in the dark.
At the same time, Fernand Boudru was staying with his parents-in-law in Seloignes. As he did every evening, this resistant to compulsory labour service set off for Forge-Philippe, where he spent the night in a barn on one of the isolated farms away from the village. He crossed the woods, Seloignes first, followed by Longwez. Fernand was used to this and knew the area well, but over the last few days the Germans had seemed very nervous. We had to be very careful not to get caught; that would be too stupid. Everyone knew that the liberation was near.
At a place called Longwez, Fernand came out of the woods. He had to cross the fields before reaching the farm. Suddenly he stops: the silhouette of a vehicle stands out in the darkness, below the road. He jumped into the ditch and tried to hide behind a tree trunk. But he was spotted; the headlights came on and illuminated his position. After a moment’s hesitation, he got up and cautiously approached the vehicle. As he got closer, he realised that this night patrol was not hostile.
« Are you Belgian ?
– Are you Americans?
– Yes, and we’re going to liberate Belgium tomorrow! »
Fernand Boudru exulted. The day an entire nation had been waiting for for over four years had arrived. He invites his liberators to eat pie at his house the next day. He tries to explain where he lives, while the GIs give him cigarettes, chewing gum and chocolate. The jeep turns back. Fernand was too euphoric to spend another night in the barn. He returns to his wife and family-in-law, eager to tell them the news. His wife starts baking the pies. He smokes his American cigarettes and shares the chocolate. His heart is light, almost forgetting that the Germans are still there. But what does it matter, it’s only a matter of hours after all!
For their part, the Yankee scouts bring back valuable information: the Germans are trying – unsuccessfully – to evacuate the Belgian villages and hamlets along the border. It was also said that the SS were gathering in Macon, and were on the alert: this was later confirmed by numerous accounts from civilians.
Liberation!
At dawn, all the soldiers of the 60th I.R. were ready to march into Belgium. H-Hour was scheduled for 6 a.m., but movements had already begun. The armoured vehicles and trucks had already started moving at 4am. At 5.30 am, the regimental command post was « closed ». At the front, Lieutenant James F. Harner led the entire column. He was a member of the 3rd Platoon, 9th Rcn. Tp, the divisional reconnaissance unit that had carried out the previous day’s reconnaissance.
Every conventional infantry division has a reconnaissance company, whose mission is to seek out and find the enemy, and to obtain as much information as possible about the position, strength, movements, nature of the troops and their identification as accurately as possible. This type of information is vital for commanders, who base their tactical decisions on intelligence analysis. In theory, such a unit should find the enemy but not engage him; the reality on the ground proved that reconnaissance elements were often the first to make contact with the enemy.
At around 7.30 am, Lieutenant Harner was in La Neuville-aux-Joutes, the last French village. Along the road was the customs café, run by Madame Hermance Doly. The various unit commanders gather there and spread out maps. They ask questions of the woman everyone calls « the Doly ». The soldiers were soon joined by the local Resistance fighters, who argued over who should go down first towards Cendron, the first Belgian village over the border. After a few minutes of cacophony, the landlady lost patience: she grabbed her walking stick and set off towards Cendron. The locals reassured her that the last SS troops had left just an hour before. Back at her café, she broke the news to the GIs, who invited her to climb aboard their jeep to liberate Belgium. The column set off again through the forest of Saint-Michel. The road makes a long curve to the left, then a final turn to the right and the hamlet of Cendron comes into view. The bridge over the Wartoise stream – which marked the Belgian-French border – was intact and the street was filled with civilians waving Belgian and American flags hastily sewn in secret. It was 9.07 am local time. Before long, the hamlet was swarming with American soldiers. The small crowd is jubilant, with young girls offering flower necklaces to the soldiers and the boys proudly posing next to the liberators and their impressive vehicles.
Quickly reassured by the identity of the visitors, the inhabitants of Cendron came out of their houses en masse to admire the unexpected spectacle. Dozens of military vehicles rolled through the hamlet, carrying hundreds of soldiers. Few stopped, in a hurry to continue their advance. The regimental staff followed the line companies closely, and a small group took advantage of a break to immortalise the moment: a few soldiers posed in front of the sign marking the Belgian border, among them Technician Fifth Grade Alfonso A. Coppola (HQ Co., 60th Infantry), who is looking at a map while shielding himself from the sun with his right hand. (Crédits : U.S. NARA – Signal Corps)
In Cendron, the inhabitants tore down a German army sign indicating the border crossing, and proudly posed in front of their trophy in front of American Signal Corps photographers (Credits: U.S. NARA – Signal Corps).
Between Cendron and Forge-Philippe, the meadow fences were cut to create a temporary runway for the artillery’s L-4 Piper Cub aircraft. On the other side of the village, the medical detachment set up an advanced medical post to enable any wounded to be treated quickly. At the same time, Lieutenant Harner’s platoon and Company A/60th I.R. continued northwards. Progress was difficult, and the inhabitants wanted to stop every vehicle to embrace the liberators. At a place called La Loge, Madame Grandjean put the Belgian flag in her window and waved a makeshift American flag every time a Jeep or lorry drove past her house. She was photographed and made the headlines on the other side of the Atlantic. At 10 a.m., Captain O’Leary and his company, the A/60th I.R., reached the Fourneau d’Oise pond, where they were again stopped by civilians before finally arriving at the Gare de Seloignes a quarter of an hour later.
At Forge-Philippe, the Piper Cub landed and took off constantly to provide information on enemy movements. A relatively long, flat field was chosen as soon as the Americans arrived in the village (Credits: Lieutenant Cook Museum, Monceau-Imbrechies).
The reconnaissance jeeps, fast and unobtrusive, scoured the area ahead. The scouts engaged the civilians, asking them questions as best they could. All the information seemed to point in the same direction: the SS were in the village of Macon, entrenched and determined to fight. Colonel Gibney was contacted by the leading elements: he asked them to remain in position pending further instructions. At the same time, a battery of 105-mm Howitzer guns was deployed in a field to the south-west of Seloignes to support the infantry as it advanced towards Macon. A salvo was fired towards the village of Monceau-Imbrechies, directly followed by the reconnaissance Jeeps which raced towards the bottom of the village, at the foot of the church. Armoured vehicles and infantry followed.
At the Lodge, Madame Grandjean waved her flags every time an American vehicle passed by. Her picture was taken by a war correspondent. The photograph was published in the American newspapers in the following days. (Credits: Lieutenant Cook Museum, Monceau-Imbrechies)
Battle of Imbrechies Ridge
On the French border in the middle of sparse forests, Macon, a peaceful village built of grey stone, is going through difficult times: the village has been chosen by the SS as a unique point of resistance. A dangerous conglomerate the size of a battalion was gathering there: the SS-Panzergrenadieren of the SS-PzGren.-Rgt. 3 ‘Deutschland’ had dug in and were supported by the artillery of the 116. PzDiv. Within a few hours, Macon was transformed into a stronghold. An observation post was set up at Le Calvaire. Its elevated position on the main road leading to Chimay made it an undeniable strategic point. Around the Place du Wicher, to the south of the village and in the Champiau quarter, the SS had dug trenches and firing positions. The village mayor, Monsieur Pépin, received a visit from emissaries of the ‘Das Reich’: the detachment was moving to Macon and would be fighting the Americans there. He was also told that any aggression by a civilian towards a German soldier would result in bloody repression and the destruction of the village. During the night of 1 to 2 September, Panzerkampfwagen V, or Panther tanks, took up positions in the region. At least one Panther was deployed in Macon to support the infantry. Finally, the detachment headquarters moved into the pharmacy in the centre of the village. At the end of the morning, American silhouettes could be seen on the horizon, on the Imbrechies ridge.
They were about twenty men from a platoon of Company A/60th I.R., led by Lieutenant Claude B. Cook. They had been sent to the Imbrechies ridge overlooking the valley to observe and report on enemy movements. Cook was in a small stable below, watching his men move into position while cooking fresh eggs from a generous farmer he had met a few minutes earlier. Suddenly, gunfire erupted, followed by explosions. The German observer had clearly identified the American presence on the ridge, but the Germans had sent out a reconnaissance patrol to clarify the disposition of their forces. A Kubelwagen with four SS men was sent along the Imbrechies road towards the ridge. At a place called Terne Rousseau, it was immediately targeted by the heavy machine gun of an M8 Armoured Car in position near Imbrechies castle.
The driver stopped and attempted a U-turn, but the manoeuvre took too long and the Kubelwagen ended up in the ditch. The two rear passengers managed to get out of the vehicle, but were mowed down by the machine gun. The driver fled along the road but was hit, his leg torn off. The last occupant understands and raises his arms. GIs moved forward to take charge of the prisoners and provide first aid to the wounded man, who died later that day.
The skirmish was enough to convince the SS to use artillery. A sustained barrage fell on the ridge. The precision of the fire was disconcerting. In just a few minutes, few of the soldiers who had taken up positions were killed. The squads seemed disorganised, and for good reason: their platoon leader, Lieutenant Cook, had just been killed. The poor man, hearing the noise of the skirmish, approached the only window in the barn, where he was killed instantly by shrapnel to the head. The locals kept his helmet, which bore the scars of the fatal blow.
Down below, Major Brown, who commanded the battalion, was worried. The precise fire from the German artillery prevented him from using the few tanks he had. The guns had to be silenced. A patrol was set up, led by Sergeant Dickinson of Company B/60th I.R. The non-commissioned officer and his few men embarked on a two-hour expedition to get around the German position, which would take them back to France. The tactical march came to an end and the objective was achieved: the SS observer was located and neutralised. Almost immediately, the fire became less accurate. That was the signal and Brown launched his armoured assault. In three columns, the tanks raced from the ridge towards Macon. A few groups of German soldiers tried to resist, but most of them understood and retreated towards Chimay and then Philippeville.
Dans l’après-midi du 2 septembre, Macon est libéré grâce à cette patrouille menée par le sergent Dickinson (centre de la photo, tourné vers la gauche), chef d’une escouade de la compagnie B/60th I.R. La patrouille victorieuse pose devant le chêne planté à l’occasion du centenaire de l’indépendance de la Belgique sur la place du village, en présence de Mr Pépin, bourgmestre du village. (Crédits : U.S. NARA – Signal Corps)
Another view of the village of Macon after the fighting, as a jeep from C Company, 15th Combat Engineer Battalion, pulls up alongside a group of infantrymen. To the rear left, Sergeant Dickinson can be seen talking to a group of civilians opposite the church. Finally, in the background on the right is the village pharmacy, which housed the SS command post during the fighting (Credits: U.S. NARA – Signal Corps).
Macon is free. Chimay, an open town, was liberated later that evening. The first day in Belgium cost the lives of a few American soldiers – including the young lieutenant Claude B. Cook – and wounded another dozen. It was the first battle on Belgian soil, the first bloodshed. It was not a failure for the German troops, as the battle prevented the advance towards Philippeville, where the remnants of the 2. and 12. SS-PzDiv. to organise the defence of the Meuse in the days that followed.
The people of Chimay gather on the Grand’Place in Chimay to celebrate the liberation at the end of the day on 2 September 1944 (Credits: U.S. NARA – Signal Corps).
Epilogue: a question of time and capacity
War is eminently competitive. First and foremost between adversaries, but also within one’s own organisation. Armed conflicts make history, and we often remember who was first. Entering Belgium is no exception. Being the first to enter Belgian territory creates a sense of pride and cohesion within the organisation, as well as a feeling of recognition for the territory concerned, which is very important for the post-war reconstruction of memory. So how can such a feat be certified, and who can authorise such recognition? Since this is of course a highly subjective subject, it is up to the historian to deal with it, accepting that he will never know the whole truth: he will therefore seek the historical truth from the sources.
We leave it to the reader to make up his or her own mind through this dossier based on three studies. However, it is necessary to provide both a context and a technical detail.
First, the context. Belgium saw the liberation of its national territory begin on 2 September. We will remember the symbolic ride of the Piron Brigade that liberated Brussels the following day, but that is about all that the national memory keeps in mind. The race for honours can be both fascinating for the rigorous historian, and can lead to lively discussions between supporters of one side or the other. The question, however, needs to be studied in greater depth, taking into account the subtleties of military operations at the time and the situation on the morning of 2 September 1944: an American infantry division does not advance in the same way as an armoured division, just as the two types of division are not employed in the same way. It is therefore important not to fall into the trap of comparing two manoeuvring elements of different types and capabilities. Nor should they be compared with the parachute weapon, which adds a third dimension to the battlefield: vertical envelopment in the case of mass airdrops or discreet infiltration for commandos.
Finally, a technical point needs to be made about timetables. Multiple sources were used in this study: American, of course, but also civilian and German. Since the aim was to determine the exact time at which the first soldiers crossed the Belgian border at Cendron, several types of report had to be analysed. However, the times used by the players – belligerents and civilians – were not the same. In this respect, we must pay tribute to Dr Paul Delahaye (†) who was the first to clarify this important aspect in his local history book Cendron Liberté (2009). Indeed at the time, there were different types of time. Firstly, solar time, the time used by farmers and more generally by the rural population; Belgian time, known as new time (today’s winter time), which already existed before the war and was used by the majority of Belgians; German time (from which we get the expression « à l’heure allemande« ), imposed by the military administration from the start of the occupation and obtained by adding one hour to Belgian time; and finally, Allied time, used by the Anglo-Americans, which adds two hours to Belgian time, the local time.
In short, when you read 8 o’clock in an American report, you have to read 7 o’clock in the German report, and 6 o’clock in a civilian report. The majority of military history books and articles on the Western Front are based on Allied time, but a rigorous study must be based on Allied, German and civilian sources, at the very least; and at the very least, define this technical peculiarity concerning times, particularly when it comes to determining who was first.
Finally, this conclusion would not be complete without pointing out to the reader that, in reality, Lieutenant James F. Harner’s scouts (3rd Platoon, 9th Rcn. Tp.) carried out a patrol on Belgian territory on the evening of 1st September, between 10 pm and midnight (local time), which de facto eliminates the competition from the 2nd A.D. in this race for honours.
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